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Hi all, I’m currently looking at a retrofit project for a commercial site that wants to ditch their old Wiegand readers for something more secure—ideally OSDP v2 to meet their new IT insurance requirements. The headache is the existing cabling. It’s mostly unshielded, and as we know, OSDP over long runs can be finicky without proper twisted pairs. I’m trying to avoid a full re-wire if possible, but I'm worried about the data integrity for their higher-security zones. Has anyone here had success using OSDP converters on legacy cables for high-stakes areas? Or is it always a case of "pull new copper or don't bother" when it comes to meeting modern audit standards? Would love to hear some field experience on where you draw the line between 'secure enough' and a total infrastructure overhaul.

its only took days of planning and actually making it work. If id of read the manual who knows Its ipb5 so way more responsive on mobile vs desktop but i dont like the home view

You know we don't look at manuals and instructions, took me a while to notice the tabs at bottom , making it a good upgrade I think

Hopefully all done for now

Its alright im still up working on it!

Spot on, @MarkP01. When sensitive data is involved, that perimeter fence is no longer enough. The challenge I’m finding is that most 'secure' systems still fall back on standard Wiegand or simple RFID, which are easy to sniff. To get to that true zero-trust level at the rack, I’ve been looking into combining OSDP v2 with mobile credentials—basically moving the encryption key all the way to the reader. I found a decent technical breakdown on how to bridge this physical-to-logical gap here: https://www.civintec.com/blog/CIVINTEC-Advanced-Data-Center-Access-Control-with-Zero-Trust-Security.html It covers exactly what you mentioned: treating the physical access point as just another untrusted node in the network until proven otherwise. Have you guys had much luck with OSDP implementations, or are you still seeing a lot of legacy hardware holding back these zero-trust goals?

Update to the random tamper problem. Some of the PIR switches had a high ohm reading. I opened up each PIR in the circuit and put an ohm meter across each tamper switch, then closed the switch. Some of the switches read 100s Ohms even with the contacts closed. What I found odd was that repeated pressing of the tamper switch lowered the resistance. I could see it drop with each press. PCB inspection didn't reveal any dry solder joints (sometimes the joints crack) but re-flowed the solder on all switch legs and the contact block just in case while I had the PCB out. Each has a closed resistance of 0.1 Ohms now, so all good and no tamper alarms since. These PIRs were first sold in 85 and I think they had a 10 year run (Honeywell IQ220), so they're between 30 - 40 years old. I know switches need a 'wetting' current to break through the surface film resistance on a contact, so it might have been something to do with that given the time in service. I'll replace all the PIRs if they become a problem, but they're fine at present. Never seen that fault before. MrHappy>When an alarm is fitted by a proper alarm co. they do boring stuff called commissioning ...... Also measured the full circuit tamper resistance and left a note in the control panel for future fault finding. A good idea. Thanks for all the replies.

If the servers or network have sensitive data on it, then make it as secure as possible, even to make it a zero-trust environment.

A little late to the Party (as usual). These were programmed/setup using a PC/Laptop - using Consys software developed by Thorn. Think they had a network system based around Windows NT, called "ThornNet" too - where panels could be networked around a site, and then connected to a computer in a main control room - running Windows NT and some Thorn developed bespoke software, that was often tailored to the site - as it would display zone maps and the like. With the Panel - there was a 16E (as in photo) and a Minerva80 with 80odd zones - the installation data / text / addresses / zones / zoned sounder allocations and the like would be set up on the laptop and then uploaded into the panel. Any changes later down the line would require an engineer with Laptop/Consys and a from memory, a Suitable data lead to make the changes. Think these panels were introduced around 1991-3 - Thorn/ADT were still fitting them in 1999 and the software was only available to their own engineers. That said, these panels also used a User Code to access certain functions, there was also an Engineers Code where you could access higher lever functions - not messed with one of these for 30something years, so can't remember if you can set stuff up on the panel via the Engineers Code and menus. Think you need the Engineers Pass to connect a laptop for up/downloading anyway as it was a function buried within a menu.

Haha, @MrHappy, don't undersell yourself! Those 'coloured wires' are the backbone of everything we’re trying to build on top of. At the end of the day, if the circuit doesn't close, the smartest Zero Trust software in the world is just a fancy UI. The reason I’m digging into this is that the IT guys on this project are making life difficult for the onsite installers. They want everything on the network, but they don't always understand the 'field' reality of hardware reliability. Trying to find that middle ground where it’s secure but still practical for someone to actually maintain without a Ph.D. in

Damn boy 🤣🤣

Its way too clever for me, I mostly twist coloured wires together to make intruder alarm circuits

Hi guys, I’m currently consult on a project for a boutique colocation data center where the client's IT department is pushing hard for a 'Zero Trust' architecture—not just for their network, but extended to physical access. We’ve already got OSDP readers at the perimeter and biometrics for the main halls, but the tenant requirements for cabinet/rack-level security are getting increasingly granular. They are starting to push back against traditional physical fobs, citing them as the 'weakest link' in the audit trail. I’m curious how many of you are actually seeing a real-world shift toward integrating physical access (like mobile credentials or MFA) directly into the logical security stack to satisfy Zero Trust audits? Are you finding that dedicated DC managers are ready to ditch physical cards entirely, or is the industry still too reliant on the 'safety' of a physical token? Would love to hear some field experience on the integration hurdles between the physical layer and IT security protocols in these high-stakes environments.

Cmon man what else will I do at 1.30am

We will be offline for a few hours

Alarm men start taking readings like sparkies just make them up

I note the OP has not posted since 🙂

I just spat my tea across my office reading that LOL !

Hkc have a doorbell coming in the next 8 years

Dahua bells even for DIY are better than most, have the SD card on monitor side option

There are several hard wired systems that provide free software with notifications. Bear in mind though none of them including Ring are 100% reliable. My doorbell occasionally forgets to let my phone know there is someone at the door even when Im on the same WiFi, it activates my home assistant everytime though

I've been told I'm better looking whilst wearing my balaclava... (no face no case) I'd guess I could walk up to lots of houses & either disable their internet by cutting the external wire or turn off their electric by pulling the fuse in the meter cupboard. The plastic doorbell may have an SD card, but will easily fall into my pocket when hit with a claw hammer ? However if I was investing in wifi jammer I'm probably coming for a car ? Does your ring door cost more or less than a tyre ?

Bear in mind ring is a diy product not a professional one. But any wifi device can be jammed. You always want to have on site recording and ideally cabled. Some people reley on edge recording (sd card in the device) but if the device is removed the footage is gone too.

I saw this post on Google and I'm absolutely furious. The Ring doorbell camera I bought on Amazon was jammed by someone using a signal blocker yesterday—there’s a 20-minute gap in the footage and I didn't even get an alert on my phone! I can't believe such an expensive Ring camera is so vulnerable. I'm planning to spend a small amount of money to install a wired camera instead, but I have a question: when an intruder approaches, will the footage be uploaded to the cloud in advance? If so, would I need to pay for a cloud subscription? I really don't want to set up a dedicated camera server to receive the video.

Lol