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Update to the random tamper problem. Some of the PIR switches had a high ohm reading. I opened up each PIR in the circuit and put an ohm meter across each tamper switch, then closed the switch. Some of the switches read 100s Ohms even with the contacts closed. What I found odd was that repeated pressing of the tamper switch lowered the resistance. I could see it drop with each press. PCB inspection didn't reveal any dry solder joints (sometimes the joints crack) but re-flowed the solder on all switch legs and the contact block just in case while I had the PCB out. Each has a closed resistance of 0.1 Ohms now, so all good and no tamper alarms since. These PIRs were first sold in 85 and I think they had a 10 year run (Honeywell IQ220), so they're between 30 - 40 years old. I know switches need a 'wetting' current to break through the surface film resistance on a contact, so it might have been something to do with that given the time in service. I'll replace all the PIRs if they become a problem, but they're fine at present. Never seen that fault before. MrHappy>When an alarm is fitted by a proper alarm co. they do boring stuff called commissioning ...... Also measured the full circuit tamper resistance and left a note in the control panel for future fault finding. A good idea. Thanks for all the replies.

If the servers or network have sensitive data on it, then make it as secure as possible, even to make it a zero-trust environment.

A little late to the Party (as usual). These were programmed/setup using a PC/Laptop - using Consys software developed by Thorn. Think they had a network system based around Windows NT, called "ThornNet" too - where panels could be networked around a site, and then connected to a computer in a main control room - running Windows NT and some Thorn developed bespoke software, that was often tailored to the site - as it would display zone maps and the like. With the Panel - there was a 16E (as in photo) and a Minerva80 with 80odd zones - the installation data / text / addresses / zones / zoned sounder allocations and the like would be set up on the laptop and then uploaded into the panel. Any changes later down the line would require an engineer with Laptop/Consys and a from memory, a Suitable data lead to make the changes. Think these panels were introduced around 1991-3 - Thorn/ADT were still fitting them in 1999 and the software was only available to their own engineers. That said, these panels also used a User Code to access certain functions, there was also an Engineers Code where you could access higher lever functions - not messed with one of these for 30something years, so can't remember if you can set stuff up on the panel via the Engineers Code and menus. Think you need the Engineers Pass to connect a laptop for up/downloading anyway as it was a function buried within a menu.

Haha, @MrHappy, don't undersell yourself! Those 'coloured wires' are the backbone of everything we’re trying to build on top of. At the end of the day, if the circuit doesn't close, the smartest Zero Trust software in the world is just a fancy UI. The reason I’m digging into this is that the IT guys on this project are making life difficult for the onsite installers. They want everything on the network, but they don't always understand the 'field' reality of hardware reliability. Trying to find that middle ground where it’s secure but still practical for someone to actually maintain without a Ph.D. in

Damn boy

Its way too clever for me, I mostly twist coloured wires together to make intruder alarm circuits

Hi guys, I’m currently consult on a project for a boutique colocation data center where the client's IT department is pushing hard for a 'Zero Trust' architecture—not just for their network, but extended to physical access. We’ve already got OSDP readers at the perimeter and biometrics for the main halls, but the tenant requirements for cabinet/rack-level security are getting increasingly granular. They are starting to push back against traditional physical fobs, citing them as the 'weakest link' in the audit trail. I’m curious how many of you are actually seeing a real-world shift toward integrating physical access (like mobile credentials or MFA) directly into the logical security stack to satisfy Zero Trust audits? Are you finding that dedicated DC managers are ready to ditch physical cards entirely, or is the industry still too reliant on the 'safety' of a physical token? Would love to hear some field experience on the integration hurdles between the physical layer and IT security protocols in these high-stakes environments.

Cmon man what else will I do at 1.30am

We will be offline for a few hours

Alarm men start taking readings like sparkies just make them up

I note the OP has not posted since

I just spat my tea across my office reading that LOL !

Hkc have a doorbell coming in the next 8 years

Dahua bells even for DIY are better than most, have the SD card on monitor side option

There are several hard wired systems that provide free software with notifications. Bear in mind though none of them including Ring are 100% reliable. My doorbell occasionally forgets to let my phone know there is someone at the door even when Im on the same WiFi, it activates my home assistant everytime though

I've been told I'm better looking whilst wearing my balaclava... (no face no case) I'd guess I could walk up to lots of houses & either disable their internet by cutting the external wire or turn off their electric by pulling the fuse in the meter cupboard. The plastic doorbell may have an SD card, but will easily fall into my pocket when hit with a claw hammer ? However if I was investing in wifi jammer I'm probably coming for a car ? Does your ring door cost more or less than a tyre ?

Bear in mind ring is a diy product not a professional one. But any wifi device can be jammed. You always want to have on site recording and ideally cabled. Some people reley on edge recording (sd card in the device) but if the device is removed the footage is gone too.

I saw this post on Google and I'm absolutely furious. The Ring doorbell camera I bought on Amazon was jammed by someone using a signal blocker yesterday—there’s a 20-minute gap in the footage and I didn't even get an alert on my phone! I can't believe such an expensive Ring camera is so vulnerable. I'm planning to spend a small amount of money to install a wired camera instead, but I have a question: when an intruder approaches, will the footage be uploaded to the cloud in advance? If so, would I need to pay for a cloud subscription? I really don't want to set up a dedicated camera server to receive the video.

Lol

When an alarm is fitted by a proper alarm co. they do boring stuff called commissioning All the circuit readings are taken at the control panel, then all the resistance, voltage and current reading are recorded to add fault finding. Fast forward 17 years later & when the tamper circuit plays up , you'd measure the circuit to find rather than 28.5Ω its now measures 380Ω Each device measures under 3Ω apart from the kitchen pir measures over 300Ω, removing the tamper wires & twisting together the circuit now read 3Ω, pir tamper switch is knackered replace item. Do you have a fat wife who waddles across the landing squashing the alarm wire between the floor board & central heating pipes ? - rewire & book her into slimming world. Do you have mice eating the cables in the loft or under the floor ? - rewire & get a cat Is the front door on the alarm on the global tamper ? its probally corroded on the terminals... replace it Its basic fault finding, normally I'd not wire anything new doubled poled & the aux tamper would be most likley used for a speaker...

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Don't use global tamper if you don't need to.as 6 days change to fsl and the panel will identify which detector/wires have the issue

For Global tamper you have to break them open to measure and compare to as fitted readings for each pair.... It's a Premier so you could go wire them all FSL/EOL then you can narrow the fault down. It may even fix it if one of the tamper pairs are faulty. Yes you can double check by opening it but that is the Aux Tamper. 10 PIR's on 8 zones is asking for trouble.

JW said open the wiring on the PCB first to see if you get same warning

>>What's wired into the AUX Tamper? All of the internal PIR tampers are daisy chained (serially). So about 10 PIRs. But they only use micro switches for the tamper. Difficult to see how any of those could malfunction. Could also be a loose connection. I just wanted to know if the 'AUX Tamper' on the PCB was the same as 'AUX 0'. As James Wilson said above, I might have to open the case on a PIR to see if I get the same warning. After that, I'll jumper the tamper on the main PCB and see if I get the same problem. If I do then it's an issue with the main PCB and not any of the tamper switches or wiring.