Dual Path Signalling Devices Dual Path Failure Reporting Times redcare vs dualcom vs webwayone

[james.wilson]

Edited first post to add webway test at grade 4

Jef I have done some tests on reporting time. Ill put them up in the signalling section.

[jimcarter]

Some of this may not be news but it shows you need to get back to the regulations, understand them and use them to your advantage (i.e. in the ability to articulate the benefits so that you can sell a better system that is not simply governed by price). How about these for a start.

BS8243 states that a dual path comms failure carries a high confidence level that an attack is taking place.

The Insurers have to minimise risk and they expect a dual path failure to be identified quickly, hence their own requirements above EN.

The key holder should be within 20 minutes reaction time to the premises. The police goal is a 10 minute response. There is no logic in reporting times greater than this for confirmed alarms.

A GSM jam is no different to a line cut. Whilst I have not heard of any in England till now, I know they have occurred in the Republic of Ireland with very large claims attached. It's a matter of time. GPRS only with little monitoring capability was the solution, when the fail was finally picked up, it was too late.

Some that to provide a monitored system is too costly and the probability of a burglary is low. So why go to the expense of installing a system that will detect a full comms fail quickly? When an event like this does happen there is no comeback on the provider only harm to the end user/installer relationship. The customer believed he was being specified a system – whatever the installer has to say later.

Encryption...whilst reporting times are being studied, and there is comment that the EN standards are being followed, all right and good. Grade 3 calls for Encryption of transmitted data.

[jb-eye]

Some of this may not be news but it shows you need to get back to the regulations, understand them and use them to your advantage (i.e. in the ability to articulate the benefits so that you can sell a better system that is not simply governed by price). How about these for a start.

Hi Jim

Everything is governed by price. DC came to the market claiming (IMO) to be selling more for less with many installers falling for the 2 is better than 1 sales being promoted even by ARC encouaging alarm co to remove R/C. In 2005 the RedCare system failed in manchester for many weeks and due to our use of E.F. on the line we remained monitored while others did not. Signalling is just one aspect of IAS and IMO the hardest to bypass. I also have not heard of blocking and BTW i am currently in the republic of ireland and the systems here in general terms dont need a gsm blocker to beat them.

BS8243 states that a dual path comms failure carries a high confidence level that an attack is taking place.

Of course i would agree with this but again i would use the reporting time as a guide. A path fail reported on one path due to the incidence/likelyhood of both paths failing together. Again i will refer you to the extremely high incidence of DC GPRS paths being on log only in the early days due to the unreliabilaty of that product at that time, a situation i might add that has been greatly improved by the manufacturer.

The Insurers have to minimise risk and they expect a dual path failure to be identified quickly, hence their own requirements above EN.

The crux of industry, The specifier!

The key holder should be within 20 minutes reaction time to the premises. The police goal is a 10 minute response. There is no logic in reporting times greater than this for confirmed alarms.

There in no logic to alarm reporting times greeater than a nano second for these situations.

A GSM jam is no different to a line cut. Whilst I have not heard of any in England till now, I know they have occurred in the Republic of Ireland with very large claims attached. It's a matter of time. GPRS only with little monitoring capability was the solution, when the fail was finally picked up, it was too late.

I would be intrested in the specifics. Did both paths fail simataniosly? I doubt it. If signaling equipment is located where it is suseptable to attack before an alarm can be transmitted then the system was incorrectly installed or the wrong signaling equipment selected.

Some that to provide a monitored system is too costly and the probability of a burglary is low. So why go to the expense of installing a system that will detect a full comms fail quickly? When an event like this does happen there is no comeback on the provider only harm to the end user/installer relationship. The customer believed he was being specified a system – whatever the installer has to say later.

Here we are completely agreed

Encryption...whilst reporting times are being studied, and there is comment that the EN standards are being followed, all right and good. Grade 3 calls for Encryption of transmitted data.

I would rather hope our equipment suppliers have paid heed.

[jimcarter]

I think we pretty much agree agree on all points Jeff (by the way, the "you" in my post was a generalisation, not you personally, hope it did not come across that way).

Short line breaks are something that as an ATS provider we (all) need to deal with. As you say, if you don't put some checks and balances in place, everything ends up on log-only, and that is a nonsense. It's how you detect a short line failure as opposed to a probable service affecting fail (or an attack) that is the key to a good system.

Happy to chat to you about the instances I refer to above but, probably best on the phone! You can call me anytime, not difficult to get hold of my number. Looks like we could chat for a long time about a number of things!

All the best

JC

[jb-eye]

I tested an end to end (unmanaged) IP solution using CID at our office for over a year. The back up was GPRS and the UDL was wireline ( i also used this for second ARC) the big issue everyone exspected was IP failure and there were a few. Every failure was accountable and normaly caused by ourselves due to AC outage or genrally buggering about with routers etc and all were transmitted when the system was showing open so on the whole i was very impressed. my manufacturer has dropped the product and my ARC failed to compromise on a reasonable charge although i was sucssesful in finding an alternative cost. I found/find the industry anti IP with prohibitive implementation for something that should be first choice for even single path systems.

Imagine a base signalling product to replace the digi that can be upgraded to dual path for greater risk. No wiring of network points because conection came in over the mains.

Or am i making things too simple again.

[alterEGO]

Imagine a base signalling product to replace the digi that can be upgraded to dual path for greater risk. No wiring of network points because conection came in over the mains.

Or am i making things too simple again.

If all those boxes were ticked with a decent year 1 cost and no problem with insurance spec, I would be happy to use them.

[jb-eye]

If all those boxes were ticked with a decent year 1 cost and no problem with insurance spec, I would be happy to use them.

Dont get the year one issue. Ofset against income or spread over 3-5 years and end of you own it. No brainer.

[alterEGO]

Dont get the year one issue. Ofset against income or spread over 3-5 years and end of you own it. No brainer.

It is an issue for us on takeovers. I get the 3/5 yr thing but who knows how many firms will still be here by the end of that contract!