Pyronix Wireless Pir

[jiml]

Jim - what was the suspected issue? That the PIR could be removed without triggering the tamper?

 

The old design has the back tamper on one side only. So if the detector was mounted in a corner but not right up against the corner, like in front of some furniture, then the tamper could be 50/50 hard to achieve. This was actually not the case as there is a wall and ceiling bracket for the detector which has it's own tamper switch for this purpose. That said, thew new design makes it hard to fit the detector without including the back tamper. It is easier and simpler. 

 

I am trying to work out how to include a picture in my post and I can show you.

[cybergibbons]

Background on that, if anyone wants it:

http://www.building.co.uk/nsi-interpretation-on-detectors-is-wrong/3033151.article

[MrHappy]

Background on that, if anyone wants it:

http://www.building.co.uk/nsi-interpretation-on-detectors-is-wrong/3033151.article

need to reg

[datadiffusion]

Yup, and I can't be arsed getting junk mail even if you can cancel. Brief synopsis or cut-n-paste for the purpose of review and criticism anyone?

[cybergibbons]

Ah, sorry, it's one of those sites that shows you the article if you go from google. From cache:

With regard to the letter from Tom Mullarkey (Chief Executive of the NSI) as published in the April edition of Security Installer, this can only be viewed as a naïve and hopelessly biased and factually incorrect missive.

The NSI have embarked upon a crusade against our Sequad detector, continuously ignoring the arguments of ourselves, as well as those of the numerous installers who have successfully installed the detector. Optex is, unarguably, the largest manufacturer of PIR detectors in the world. Our products are premium market devices, relying on technology to offer some of the most stable and high performance detectors available in the world's security markets.

They are not the cheapest, mainly because we will not compromise on quality of manufacture and catch performance.

  In developing the Sequad detector, we worked on the information that was available in the open arena, to ensure that we manufactured a device that met the requirements of DD243:2002 as well as giving installers an alternative to installing additional detection devices which would be a costly and technically inferior solution. We also took legal advice to ensure that we were legally compliant with the draft legislation.

Tom Mullarkey claims that some 200,000 false alarms were generated annually by faulting PIR's. This is, if nothing else, blatantly misleading. He neglects to mention that the NSI supports the research of Professor Martin Gill and Martin Hemming that states that "it is estimated that around 95 per cent of movement detectors returned to manufacturers as possibly faulty are in fact found to have no fault, and there is a possibility that manufacturers are being blamed for more than their fair share of the problem".

It is also generally accepted that Optex have the lowest returns rate in the industry, figures for which have been supplied from our major customers, the security equipment distributors.

He then goes on to claim that the technology of two movement detectors in a single housing is likely to increase false alarms. This is false, and as one of the most technologically advanced manufacturers of PIR's, Optex certainly have the credentials to state that such a statement is wrong. Perhaps the NSI would care to state what research they have carried out to support their opinion. The references to environmental situations that will cause false alarms with our detector are interesting.

  Firstly, he ignores the fact that the detector utilises enhanced technology to eliminate these sorts of problems, and secondly, it shows the NSI give little credit to installers who should take such matters into account when designing and installing systems.

If the NSI are really considering themselves to be a member of the responsible sector of the industry, why do they continue to ignore the evidence of the product itself, and continuously insist on a separation distance as mentioned in a (Building Research Establishment) report that does not apply to non-overlapping detectors?

 

There is no requirement for a distance of 2.5 meters, or even 1.5 meters, or any other distance in DD243:2002. The requirement is "to locate move-ment detectors far enough apart so as to minimise the possibility of sequentially confirmed alarms being false alarms". In the Sequad they are far enough apart, and the detector does minimise the possibility of sequentially confirmed alarms being false.

There are currently in excess of 30,000 Sequad detectors being used in DD243 compliant systems. If the products were generating false alarms, wouldn't the whole industry know about it by now? As for pointing my research team clearly at the problem, how can I do that, when the problem is being generated by the NSI themselves?

 

Finally, I received today a copy of a letter received by an installer who is currently using the Optex Sequad detector, and whom had written to Tom Mullarkey echoing the views of Mike Cahalane. The letter was from Richard Norburn of the NSI, with regards to the fact that anyone using the Sequad detector would be issued a non-compliance. Richard finishes his letter by stating "I imagine that the (BSI) Committee members would be very interested to hear how you propose that the DD should discriminate between proprietary units that incorporate innovative technology to minimise false alarms, and others which do not and which may therefore be less immune to false alarms".

Well I have a suggestion to the NSI, let responsible manufacturers such as Optex continue to develop innovative products, and give your own approved installers some credit in recognising what works and what doesn't.

I would suggest that all installers who have used the Sequad detector should inform the BSI directly of their experiences, good or bad, and ensure that their opinions are properly accounted for. Don't bet on the NSI having your best interests at heart if their reaction to our Sequad detector is anything to go by.*

 

* Peter G. Harries, MD

Optex (Europe) Ltd

[james.wilson]

Jim you can upload images by pressing the reply button rather than quick reply which is below the topic

[matthew.brough]

@cg

I remember those days and I had my own run ins with Norburn. What the nsi did to optex was downright disgusting. We installed sequads an loved them. A very reliable detector and I can't think of any instance of a sequentially confirmed alarm happening falsely with them. Adds weight to the idea 3rd party testing is the fairest method of judging compliance, IMO NSI had no right at the time to issue non conformities. The manufacturer said it was compliant and under the framework available at the time the certification body had to accept that as proof it was. I'm not sure if any legal action was taken by optex against nsi or what the outcome was but if my sales had been tarnished I would have certainly sued nsi for my losses.

[AdrianMealing]

Dunno norm although wouldn't shock me. Maybe an nsi company here will remember. SSAIB at the time said they would make a note if using them but didn't do us for using them. I felt sorry for optex, god knows what lost sales nsi cost them.

A lot, i know i was involved in the product development

[matthew.brough]

Damn shame as I thought the sequad was a mighty fine bit of kit.

[jiml]

Pic of the new back tamper as promised.

Jim you can upload images by pressing the reply button rather than quick reply which is below the topic